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ABSTRACT
This article examines the potential for impactful sanctuary policies
in Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina in light of anti-sanctuary and
anti-immigrant state laws implemented in the past decade and in the wake
of the 2016 presidential election. The article first reviews changes to immigration law which both increased the number of noncitizens subject to
removal from the United States. The article also reviews the effects of
anti-sanctuary and anti-immigrant laws on areas such as community
safety, community-police relations, and state and local civil liability. The
article then explores the national resistance to both Secure Communities
and other forms of collaboration between localities and ICE, focusing on
advocacy efforts that promote sanctuary policies. The article concludes
by reviewing the most recent federal efforts to counter sanctuary policies,
and discusses the tools that communities can use to limit local law enforcement collaboration with federal enforcement in the current political
landscape at the state and federal levels.
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INTRODUCTION
Starting in the 1980s, immigration law in the United States gradually
transformed through a patchwork of laws which dramatically increased
the number of noncitizens subject to removal from the United States. This
patchwork of laws included the War on Drugs and its related legislation.1

1

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1986 gave the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (now the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement) the power to hold
noncitizens in local custody for drug offenses. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-570, § 1302, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-41 (1986).
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Instituted after the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,2 the
Criminal Alien Program (CAP) and other similar programs allowed for
the expeditious deportation of any noncitizen convicted of an enumerated
deportable offense.3 The CAP program fostered collaboration between
the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) and local authorities,
enabling INS to utilize state, local, and federal custody as a pipeline for
the deportation of noncitizens.4
Throughout the 1990s, Congress continued to pass laws that would
allow for the deportation of more people by way of contact with the criminal legal system and limit eligibility for relief from removal for noncitizens convicted of certain criminal offenses.5 By far, one of the most
sweeping and influential pieces of immigration legislation passed in the
United States was the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which expanded the categories of
qualifying crimes that could subject a noncitizen to deportation.6 In addition, IIRIRA created the concept of “287(g) agreements,” memoranda of
agreement which grant local enforcement authorities the power to carry
out certain federal immigration law enforcement tasks.7
The landscape of U.S. immigration law again changed in the wake
of September 11, 2001, as a result of the United States’ increased focus
on national security and deportations. In 2008, a controversial federal program named Secure Communities was created, giving federal immigration authorities further power to detain individuals with certain criminal
2

Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986).
3 AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM (CAP) (2013) [hereinafter
CAP], https://perma.cc/8RL3-AJUH. In 1988, the Alien Criminal Apprehension Program
(ACAP) and the Institutional Removal Program (IRP) were formed, and then consolidated in
2006 into CAP. Id. at 2. Deportable offenses are enumerated in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1127(a)(2) (2018).
4 See CAP, supra note 3, at 1-2, 4.
5 The Immigration Act was signed in 1990 by President George H.W. Bush with the
stated goal of targeting non-citizens convicted of certain drug offense for removal. George
Bush: Statement on Signing the Immigration Act of 1990, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Nov. 29,
1990), https://perma.cc/TP2Z-HBZR (“[The Act] meets several objectives of my Administration’s war on drugs and violent crime. Specifically, it provides for the expeditious deportation
of aliens who, by their violent criminal acts, forfeit their right to remain in this country.”); see
also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996). For a report dispelling misconceptions of non-citizens as being more prone to
commit crimes and detailing the law enforcement tactics used against non-citizens suspected
of having committed crimes, see WALTER A. EWING ET AL., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2015), https://perma.cc/WY5QX4LT.
6 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 to -628 (1996).
7 INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2018).
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histories under the auspices of creating safer communities through collaboration with local law enforcement.8
During the 2000s, local law enforcement and federal authorities involved with immigration enforcement implemented programs that facilitated cooperation between them. A significant number of state and local
governments entered into 287(g) agreements with the federal government,9 paving the way for local law enforcement to carry out federal immigration enforcement work. Starting in 2010, a wave of states began to
pass laws further aiding federal law enforcement’s efforts to deport
noncitizens, although courts deemed many provisions were unconstitutional. Among other features, these state laws criminalized applying for
work without work authorization, penalized failing to register with the
U.S. government, and criminalized the mere status of being undocumented and present in the United States. Leading this state effort, Arizona
passed SB 1070.10 Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Indiana, and Utah
also passed similar laws.11
In 2011 and 2014, DHS, in a series of memoranda, outlined the prioritization of the deportation of noncitizens with criminal histories.12 In
2013, the United States deported the highest number of individuals in any
one year.13 In light of significant opposition to the Secure Communities
program, ICE replaced the program with the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) in 2014.14 Many of the main tenets of Secure Communities

8 Secure
Communities,
U.S.
IMMIGR.
&
CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT,
https://perma.cc/PB5Y-G5YA (last updated Jan. 3, 2018); see also MICHELE WASLIN,
IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE SECURE COMMUNITIES
PROGRAM: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND CONTINUING CONCERNS
(2011),
https://perma.cc/9THQ-E7V3.
9 See RANDY CAPPS, ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: A
STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 9-12 (2011),
https://perma.cc/Z7CD-5GW2.
10 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
11 H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011); H.B. 87, 2011-2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ga. 2011); S.B. 590, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011); S.B. 20, 20112012 Gen. Assemb., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2011); H.B. 497, 2011 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2011).
12 See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Enf’t, et al. (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Priority Memo], https://perma.cc/ESB2-P6FV; Memorandum from Peter S. Vincent,
Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
to All Chief Counsel, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (Nov. 17, 2011),
https://perma.cc/72KN-XRFL.
13 See Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. Deportations of Immigrants
Reach Record High in 2013, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 2, 2014), https://perma.cc/UZM3-MXYV.
14 See Priority Enforcement Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
https://perma.cc/R6FQ-AVEU (last visited May 15, 2018).
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were still part of the PEP program, such as the use of detainer requests.15
Shortly after his inauguration, President Trump signed an executive order
essentially stating that all immigrants who could be deportable are priorities for deportation.16 In a memorandum implementing the executive order, the DHS restored the Secure Communities program and ended PEP.17
While certain states were seeking to criminalize the presence of immigrants and the federal government was deporting people in increasingly
larger numbers, localities across the country took the opposite approach
in support of community safety and family unity. After 2011, many localities adopted what are now referred to as sanctuary policies or trust policies.18 For simplicity, we will refer to both types of policies as sanctuary
policies throughout the article.
The term “sanctuary” as it relates to sanctuary policies, originates
from the United States in the 1980s when religious institutions protected
Central American refugees from the threat of deportation.19 At the end of
the 20th century, Central American refugees fled war-ravaged countries
such as El Salvador and Guatemala.20 At the time, the Reagan Administration supported the repressive governments from which the individuals were fleeing, and as such, refugees’ asylum claims were not approved.21 Religious institutions provided legal assistance, food, medical
care, and employment.22
Current sanctuary policies are a mixture of legislation, ordinances,
and policies adopted by states, localities, and sheriffs’ offices across the
country.23 Sanctuary policies impose varying limitations on cooperation
15 See id. (delineating that under PEP, detainers could only be issued where an immigration officer had reason to believe the noncitizen had been convicted of various crimes, rather
than convicted or merely charged as it was under Secure Communities).
16 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (“We cannot faithfully execute the immigration laws of the United States if we exempt classes or categories of
removable aliens from potential enforcement.”). The executive order also prioritizes the deportation of any removable noncitizens who “[i]n the judgment of an immigration officer,
otherwise pose a risk to public safety or national security.” Id. at 8,800.
17 Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://perma.cc/4UZP-UXFT.
18 By the end of 2014, almost 300 states or localities implemented some form of sanctuary
policies, including Santa Clara County, California and Cook County, Illinois. CATHOLIC
LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., STATES AND LOCALITIES THAT LIMIT COMPLIANCE WITH
ICE DETAINER REQUESTS (2014) [hereinafter CATHOLIC LEGAL, SANCTUARY POLICIES],
https://perma.cc/DZA3-ZGK5.
19 Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era, MIGRATION
POL’Y INST. (Apr. 1, 2006), https://perma.cc/RE7P-4N4S.
20 Id.
21 See id.
22 Id.
23 See CATHOLIC LEGAL, SANCTUARY POLICIES, supra note 22.
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with ICE, ranging from prohibiting law enforcement agencies from using
funds or personnel “to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest
persons for immigration enforcement purposes”24 to prohibiting the release of any information regarding a person’s release date or court appearance dates in response to federal inquiries.25 Other sanctuary policies limit
when a local law enforcement officer or government worker may inquire
into the immigration status of an individual. As of December 2017, there
were an estimated 760 counties with at least some form of sanctuary policy in place.26 However, the 2016 presidential election unleashed a new
era of anti-immigrant and anti-sanctuary policies, as well as sanctuary
policies.
I.

ANTI-IMMIGRANT AND ANTI-SANCTUARY STATE LAWS

The impact of anti-immigrant and anti-sanctuary legislation in Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina is a key piece of evidence for why
anti-sanctuary policies and other anti-immigrant legislation are bad policy. The laws’ impact on states is apparent in community-police relations
and evidenced by the localities’ exposure to civil liability. Moreover,
these laws contribute to unconstitutional detention and arrest, discriminatory policing, and decreased trust between communities and local police,
which are all effects that sanctuary policies seek to prevent. These experiences should not only guide states and Congress away from passing antisanctuary legislation, but also energize community groups to both continue pushing for sanctuary policies and litigate against the unlawful aspects of local law enforcement collaboration with ICE.
In 2010, Arizona initiated a wave of state-level anti-immigrant laws
across the country when it enacted S.B. 1070.27 At the time, S.B. 1070
was among the harshest of anti-immigrant laws enacted in recent history.
S.B. 1070’s stated goal was to “make attrition [of immigrants] through
enforcement a top public policy priority of all state and local government

24

California Values Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6(a)(1) (West 2018).
See N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 9-131(f)(9) (2018).
26 See KRSNA AVILA ET AL., IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., THE RISE OF SANCTUARY:
GETTING LOCAL OFFICERS OUT OF THE BUSINESS OF DEPORTATIONS IN THE TRUMP ERA 9
(2018) [hereinafter ILRC, THE RISE OF SANCTUARY], https://perma.cc/KF2Y-LXKL (reflecting the number of counties that have policies against holding people on ICE detainers). Of the
3,015 U.S. counties reviewed by the report’s authors, 24% had limits to ICE holds, 6% had
restrictions on notifications to ICE about individuals’ release dates or other information, 4%
had limits on ICE access to local jails and or ICE interrogations of individuals, 4% prohibited
inquiries into immigration status and/or place of birth, and 4% prohibited participation generally in immigration enforcement. Id.
27 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
25
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agencies in Arizona.”28 The law contained provisions that generally criminalized the presence of undocumented persons.29 In addition, S.B. 1070
criminalized the employment of undocumented persons and the provision
of transportation assistance to undocumented persons.30 The law also
barred localities from limiting their cooperation with ICE.31 Additionally,
the law authorized local law enforcement officers to ask individuals for
immigration documents establishing their immigration status during routine traffic stops – these provisions, known as “show me your papers,”
stoked fears of racial profiling.32
After Arizona’s legislature passed S.B. 1070, there were approximately twenty-four copycat bills up for debate in state legislatures around
the United States.33 Five states passed copycat anti-immigrant bills, including Alabama,34 Georgia,35 and South Carolina.36 Georgia passed its
Arizona copycat law, H.B. 87, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act, in 2011.37 Alabama followed suit by passing copycat law,
H.B. 56, in the same year.38 H.B. 56 was heralded as the law that “attacks
every aspect” of an undocumented person’s life.39 South Carolina passed
S.B. 20 in 2011, which similarly sought to assert state control over immigration matters.40 In this article, we distinguish between anti-sanctuary
provisions of state laws and anti-immigrant laws generally. Anti-sanctuary provisions of state laws prohibit localities from taking certain actions
toward creating and carrying out sanctuary policies and are typically a
subset of anti-immigrant laws. Anti-immigrant laws generally promote
cooperation between local law enforcement and ICE or criminalize certain actions.

28

Id. at § 1.
Id. at § 3.
30 Id. at §§ 5-7.
31 Id. at § 2.
32 See Id.
33 Arizona’s S.B. 1070, ACLU, https://perma.cc/U85B-A62J (last visited May 18, 2018).
34 H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011).
35 H.B. 87, 2011-2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011).
36 S.B. 20, 2011-2012 Gen. Assemb., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2011). Indiana and Utah also
passed copycat legislation. See S.B. 590, 117th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011); H.B.
497, 2011 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2011).
37 H.B. 87, 2011-2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011).
38 H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011).
39 Justin Cox, Alabama Under Siege: The Human Costs of H.B. 56, ACLU (Feb. 27, 2012,
4:17 PM), https://perma.cc/6SWX-7M2F (statement of Rep. Micky Hammon, who introduced
the bill, during a debate).
40 S.B. 20, 2011-2012 Gen. Assemb., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2011).
29
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Case Study: State Legislation Limiting Sanctuary Policies in
Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina

The consequences of a law’s anti-sanctuary policies are important to
note. When states prohibit sanctuary policies and force localities to cooperate with ICE on matters such as detainer requests and arrests during
local law enforcement encounters, they expose themselves to civil liability and erode community trust. Additionally, as evidenced in Georgia, a
state oversight mechanism over anti-immigrant and anti-sanctuary legislation can lead to government overreach and a waste of taxpayer dollars.
Within their anti-immigrant laws, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina also enacted anti-sanctuary legislative provisions. The State of Alabama specifically adopted provisions aimed at preventing localities from
implementing policies which limited cooperation with federal immigration authorities.41 One provision of Alabama’s H.B. 56 explicitly prevents
localities from limiting communication with ICE in violation of certain
federal statutes.42 These federal statutes, 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1644, prohibit localities from restricting local officials’ communication
with federal authorities regarding an individual’s immigration status and
prohibit government officials from limiting any official’s ability to send
or receive information from ICE.43
Alabama’s H.B. 56 further imposed financial penalties in the form
of limitations on funding to localities deemed non-compliant.44 Furthermore, the law created a private right of action for any U.S. citizen, or
41

H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5 (Ala. 2011).
Id. H.B. 56 was codified in the Code of Alabama, and the relevant part states, “No
official or agency of this state or any political subdivision thereof, including, but not limited
to, an officer of a court of this state, may adopt a policy or practice that limits or restricts the
enforcement of federal immigration laws by limiting communication between its officers and
federal immigration officials in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 or 8 U.S.C. § 1644, or that restricts its officers in the enforcement of this chapter.” ALA. CODE § 31-13-5(a) (2018). 8
U.S.C. § 1644 (2018) reads, “[N]o State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in
any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the [INS] information regarding the
immigration status, lawful, or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)(b) (2018) reads, “[A] Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit,
or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from,
the [INS] information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of
any individual . . . . [N]o person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal,
State, or local government entity from doing any of the following with respect to information
regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual: (1) Sending such information to, or requesting or receiving such information from, the [INS]. (2) Maintaining
such information. (3) Exchanging such information with any other Federal, State, or local
government entity.”
43 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373, 1644 (2018).
44 H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5 (Ala. 2011) (“If . . . an official or agency of this
state or any political subdivision thereof, including, but not limited to, an officer of a court in
42
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noncitizen lawfully present in the state, and a resident of Alabama, to sue
at the trial court level in Alabama state court under this provision.45 However, this provision was subsequently amended in 2012 to limit this
right.46 Now, U.S. citizens and noncitizens lawfully present in the state
who are residents of Alabama may petition the Attorney General of Alabama or any local district attorneys to bring forth such a lawsuit.47 If a
judicial finding is made that an official or head of agency violated this
provision, a court must impose a fine of $1,000 to $5,000 for each day
that a policy or practice is in place.48 Effectively, this law gives private
citizens a role in enforcing provisions of the anti-sanctuary law legally, a
law which could potentially expose a locality to civil liability.49
South Carolina’s S.B. 20 similarly limited the localities’ ability to
pass sanctuary policies. S.B. 20 created a private right of action for citizens to enjoin a locality’s policies that limit or prohibit local law enforcement’s, or other local government employees’ ability to enforce state law
related to immigration and to communicate with government officials regarding a person’s immigration status.50 Additionally, the legislation
granted courts the permission to impose fines on any locality that the court
found to be in willful violation of the law.51
In 2009, prior to the passage of H.B 87 in 2011, the Georgia legislature amended its statutes to prohibit local governments from implementing sanctuary policies.52 Georgia also created a penalty to withhold funding from localities found in violation of the law.53 If a locality were to be
found in violation of the section on sanctuary policies, the locality could

this state, is in violation of this subsection . . . that agency or political subdivision shall not be
eligible to receive any funds, grants, or appropriations from the State of Alabama until such
violation has ceased and the Attorney General has so certified.”).
45 ALA. CODE § 31-13-5(d) (2011) (amended 2012).
46 H.B. 658, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ala. 2012) (amending ALA. CODE § 31-13-5(d)
(2011)).
47 ALA. CODE § 31-13-5(d) (2018).
48 Id.
49 See discussion infra Section I.A.2.
50 S.B. 20, 2011-2012 Gen. Assemb., 119th Sess. § 1 (S.C. 2011).
51 Id.
52 S.B. 20, 2009-2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009). The Georgia bill states, “No
local governing body, whether acting through its governing body or by an initiative, referendum, or any other process, shall enact, adopt, implement, or enforce any sanctuary policy.” Id.
at § 2. A sanctuary policy is defined in the Georgia code as: “[A]ny regulation, rule, policy,
or practice adopted by a local governing body which prohibits or restricts local officials or
employees from communicating or cooperating with federal officials or law enforcement officers with regard to reporting immigration status information while such local official or employee is acting within the scope of his or her official duties.” GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-23(a)(6)
(2017).
53 GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-23(c) (2017).
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lose state funding or state administered federal funding, with some exceptions, such as funding related to emergency medical care and certain types
of disaster relief.54
In Georgia’s prohibition on sanctuary policies in H.B. 87, Georgia
also sought to control the exchange of information between ICE and localities. Georgia law now states that, unless prohibited by federal law,
state employees “shall not be prohibited from receiving or maintaining
information relating to the immigration status of any individual or sending
or exchanging such information with other federal, state, or local governmental entities or employees for official public safety purposes.”55 Furthermore, the provision states that localities should not be prohibited from
utilizing federal resources such as databases and equipment “related to
the enforcement of state and federal immigration laws.”56 In 2016, Georgia also passed S.B. 269, which requires that when state agencies provide
funding to localities certify the localities’ compliance with the state’s antisanctuary law provisions that prohibit limitations on exchange of information regarding immigration status and the localities’ use of federal
sources for immigration enforcement.57
1.

A Limited Number of Local Policies Limiting Collaboration
with ICE, Exist in Various Locaties in Alabama and Georgia

A limited number of localities in Alabama and Georgia have implemented sanctuary polices. South Carolina has implemented none.58 However, there are existing sanctuary policies that could be implemented in
these states that would not conflict with the anti-sanctuary provisions of
state laws. Georgia, for example, has seven localities that have chosen to
limit their cooperation with federal immigration authorities in a way that
is not in conflict with state law.59 It should be noted that there are a limited
number of sanctuary policies in these states, despite the fact that the antisanctuary state provisions in Georgia and Alabama do not specifically bar
localities from refusing to honor voluntary requests to hold individuals
after their time in local custody has ended.
54

Id. These exceptions include the following scenarios where verification of lawful presence is not required in GA. CODE ANN. § 50-36-1(d) (2017).
55 GA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-17(b)(1) (2017).
56 Id. at § 35-1-17(b)(3).
57 S.B. 269, 2015-2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2016).
58 As of 2014, there are no cities designated as Sanctuary Cities in South Carolina despite
the fact that the state has a thriving immigrant community. See CATHOLIC LEGAL, SANCTUARY
POLICIES, supra note 22. See generally AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, IMMIGRANTS IN SOUTH
CAROLINA (2017), https://perma.cc/KN8Y-D7YK (reporting statistics on South Carolina’s immigrant population).
59 See discussion infra Section II.A.1.
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As of the date of publication of this article, Tuskegee was the first
and only locality in Alabama to limit cooperation with ICE and limit local
law enforcement’s ability to carry out immigration functions.60 Tuskegee
passed a resolution that made it improper for law enforcement to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, and immigration status. The Tuskegee
resolution states:
[U]nless otherwise provided by the United States Constitution and
laws of the United States, and/or the laws and constitution of the State of
Alabama, citizenship, immigration status, national origin, race, ethnicity,
and the presence of an immigration detainer request, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, notification request, administrative immigration
warrant, or other civil immigration custody documents should have no
bearing on an individual’s treatment in police custody (including but not
limited to classification status, eligibility for work programs, or eligibility
for pretrial diversion or alternatives to incarceration programs), or on officials’ decisions to initiate questioning, stops or make arrests.61
The Birmingham City Council has also adopted a sanctuary city resolution; however the resolution does not explicitly address limiting Birmingham’s cooperation with ICE.62
A number of localities in Georgia have implemented policies that are
in compliance with the anti-sanctuary provisions of Georgia law. These
include Fulton, Clayton, DeKalb, Fayette, and Clarke counties, as well as
the City of Clarkston and the City of Decatur.63 Fulton County Commissioners passed a resolution urging the Fulton County Sheriff to limit cooperation with ICE by not holding individuals beyond their release dates
at the expense of Fulton County, not turning over individuals to ICE without a judicial warrant, and not allowing ICE to use county facilities for
interviews and investigations.64 The sheriff’s offices in Clayton, DeKalb,
and Clarke counties have implemented policies do not allow for prolonged detention of individuals on the sole basis of ICE detainers in order
to protect those jurisdictions from civil liability. These counties require
60 Press Release, National Day Laborer Organizing Network, Tuskegee, First City in Alabama to Enact an Immigrant TRUST Policy, Reject Entanglement with Immigration Enforcement (May 27, 2015), https://perma.cc/S3QA-58TM. Birmingham, Alabama did pass a resolution naming itself a “Sanctuary City” but did not take any specific steps to do so, such as
limiting compliance with ICE detainers. See Birmingham City Councilors Approve Sanctuary
City Resolution, BIRMINGHAM CITY COUNCIL, https://perma.cc/2A8D-KN33 (last visited May
18, 2018).
61 Res. 2015-61, City Council of the City of Tuskagee (2015), https://perma.cc/K6HCYVQ6.
62 See Birmingham City Councilors Approve Sanctuary City Resolution, supra note 71.
63 PROJECT SOUTH ET AL., GEORGIA NON-DETAINER POLICIES, https://perma.cc/2ARTMYX7.
64 Res. 14-0683, Fulton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs (2014), https://perma.cc/3M2B-LLVT.
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ICE to provide a judicial warrant in order to extend the detention of any
individual in local custody.65
Localities in Alabama can adopt similar policies to those in Georgia
as its state laws do not require local officers to honor ICE detainers and
hold individuals in local custody for an ICE detainer.66 South Carolina,
on the other hand, requires that if an officer determines that a person is
unlawfully present in the United States, that officer:
[S]hall determine in cooperation with the Illegal Immigration Enforcement Unit within the South Carolina Department of Public Safety or
the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, as applicable,
whether the officer shall retain custody of the person for the underlying
criminal offense for which the person was stopped, detained, investigated,
or arrested, or whether the Illegal Immigration Enforcement Unit within
the South Carolina Department of Public Safety or the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, as applicable, shall assume custody
of the person.67
As discussed below, practices like this that require localities to
honor ICE detainers expose localities to civil liability because such a practice creates the risk that individuals will be held in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Legal challenges to provisions of this type may be necessary
to open the door for policies that limit compliance with ICE detainers.68
2.

Cooperation with ICE Detainer Requests Exposes Localities to
Civil Liability

Over 760 counties in the United States limit compliance with ICE
detainers.69 However, as discussed above, South Carolina has no localities

65 Jeremy Redmon, ICE: Clayton, DeKalb Sheriff’s Officials Limiting Cooperation,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 20, 2017, 2:56 PM), https://perma.cc/AEZ6-V5F5.
66 H.B. 658, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Ala. 2012) (amending ALA. CODE § 32-6-9(d)
(2011)). The bill removed the following language: “A verification inquiry, pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1373(c), shall be made within 48 hours to the Law Enforcement Support Center of
the United States Department of Homeland Security or other office or agency designated for
that purpose by the federal government. If the person is determined to be an alien unlawfully
present in the United States, the person shall be considered a flight risk and shall be detained
until prosecution or until handed over to federal immigration authorities.” ALA. CODE § 32-69(d) (2011) (amended 2012). As a result, Alabama removed any state law requiring localities
to hold an individual pursuant to an ICE detainer.
67 S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-13-170(C)(4) (2018).
68 A preliminary injunction was initially granted in a legal challenge to this particular
South Carolina provision, but was later reversed by the same court. United States v. South
Carolina, 840 F. Supp. 2d 898 (D.S.C. 2011), modified, 906 F. Supp. 2d 463 (D.S.C. 2012),
aff’d, 720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013).
69 ILRC, THE RISE OF SANCTUARY, supra note 31, at 9.
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that limit compliance with ICE detainers, and Alabama has just one locality that limits its compliance with ICE detainers. ICE detainers are a hallmark of local law enforcement cooperation with federal immigration authorities. As discussed previously, by honoring ICE detainers, localities
are agreeing to hold individuals past the period of the individual’s arrest.
In lawsuits brought against localities that honor detainers, courts around
the country are finding that holding an individual past that individual’s
release date from custody in the absence of a judicial warrant is unconstitutional.70 As a result, localities are held liable for having honored detainers. Courts have held that holding an individual beyond the date of release
could constitute an arrest and is therefore subject to scrutiny under the
Fourth Amendment, which requires a finding of probable cause for a new
arrest.71 The First Circuit stated that ICE must have probable cause to issue a detainer request in order to be compliant with the Fourth Amendment because holding someone pursuant to an ICE detainer is a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment.72 The Northern District of Illinois found
that detainers issued in Chicago were unconstitutional because ICE made
no findings of individuals’ flight risk prior to issuing the detainers.73 The
70 See, e.g., Santoyo v. United States, No. 5:16-CV-855-OLG, slip op. at 8 (W.D. Tex.
June 5, 2017) (finding that Plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of
liability as the locality held the Plaintiff for forty-eight hours pursuant to an ICE detainer
without probable cause that the Plaintiff had committed a criminal offense); see also Shareef
Omar, Note, Breaking the Ice: Reforming State and Local Government Compliance with Ice
Detainer Requests, 40 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 159, 184 (2015) (discussing various settlements,
ranging from $40,000 - $145,000, between localities and plaintiffs involving detainers).
71 In Morales v. Chadbourne, the First Circuit held that holding an individual beyond
their date of release is an arrest under the Fourth Amendment. Morales v. Chadbourne, 793
F.3d 208, 217-18 (1st Cir. 2015). In Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, a district court
in Oregon held that holding an individual who could have been released on bail was a new
arrest which the enforcement officers did not have lawful authority to make. Miranda-Olivares
v. Clackamas County, No. 3:12–cv–02317–ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *9-11 (D. Or. Apr. 11,
2014). Additionally, the court noted that an ICE detainer on its face states only that an investigation “has been initiated” to determine whether an individual is subject to removal, and so
does not provide probable cause for an arrest. Id. at 11 (citing Arizona v. United States, 567
U.S. 387, 413 (“Detaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status would raise
constitutional concerns.”)).
72 Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d at 216-18.
73 Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1008-09 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“The bottom
line is that, because immigration officers make no determination whatsoever that the subject
of a detainer is likely to escape upon release before a warrant can be obtained, ICE’s issuance
of detainers that seek to detain individuals without a warrant goes beyond its statutory authority to make warrantless arrests under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2).”). Statutory authority for detainers
is based on 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). 8 U.S.C. § 1226 grants ICE the authority to arrest an individual pending a decision on removability from the United States with
a warrant issued by the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2018). Under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a)(2), there is the exception to arrest without a judicial warrant if an individual is “entering or attempting to enter the United States” or if an ICE officer has “reason to believe”
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New York State Office of the Attorney General warned New York localities of the potential exposure to civil liability if they honored ICE detainer requests in the absence of judicial warrants.74 The Office of the Attorney General cautioned that there are only a few instances where
cooperation with federal immigraiton law enforcement is reasonable,
such as where ICE or CBP provides a judicial warrant, there is probable
cause to believe that the person has illegally reentered the country and
was previously convicted of a serious criminal offense, or the person has
engaged in terrorist activity.75 Many localities with sanctuary policies
limit compliance with ICE detainers by refusing to detain individuals with
non-serious criminal offenses, therefore avoiding some risk of civil liability.76
3.

Localities without Sanctuary Policies Carry Out Federal Law
Enforcement Tasks, yet Remain Uncompensated by the
Federal Government

In addition to exposing themselves to civil liability in order to meet
an increasing number of detainer requests, localities are paying to detain
additional individuals and using their resources without financial assistance from the federal government.77 As of December 2017, over 114
counties had policies against using local resources to carry out immigration enforcement.78 The costs of complying with detainer requests include
the utilization of local resources and the potential expenses related to lawsuits regarding the unconstitutionality of detainers. In addition, some law

that an individual is in the United States “in violation of any such law or regulation and is
likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2018).
74 N.Y. STATE ATTORNEY GEN. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, GUIDANCE CONCERNING LOCAL
AUTHORITY PARTICIPATION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND MODEL SANCTUARY
PROVISIONS 4-5 (2017), https://perma.cc/SC7D-BN9G.
75 See id. at 4, 9-10.
76 See CATHOLIC LEGAL, SANCTUARY POLICIES, supra note 22.
77 Letter from David Venturella, Assistant Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to
Miguel Márquez, Cty. Counsel, Cty. of Santa Clara, https://perma.cc/JS36-KL3L; see also
JUDITH A. GREENE, JUSTICE STRATEGIES, THE COST OF RESPONDING TO IMMIGRATION
DETAINERS IN CALIFORNIA (2012), https://perma.cc/Z94E-BFRS (finding that Los Angeles
County spends $26 million annually to honor ICE detainers, while California spends a total of
$65 million annually); EDWARD F. RAMOS, FISCAL IMPACT ANALYSIS OF MIAMI-DADE’S
POLICY ON “IMMIGRATION DETAINERS,” https://perma.cc/FV9Z-GQQF (estimating that Miami-Dade County spends approximately $12.5 million each year to honor ICE detainers).
78 ILRC, THE RISE OF SANCTUARY, supra note 31, at 9.
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enforcement officials are concerned that taking time away to conduct immigration enforcement will reduce the ability of police to complete tasks
necessary for regular police functions.79
4.

Unlawful and Prolonged Detention During Police Encounters
Could Be Prevented or Limited Under Sanctuary Policies

Some of the most concerning provisions of anti-immigrant state laws
in Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina (and antithetical to sanctuary
policies) were those that authorized local law enforcement officers to request documents related to an individual’s immigration status, due to the
attendant risk of law enforcement officers using unlawful and prolonged
detention in order to obtain such information.80 In Arizona v. United
States, Justice Anthony Kennedy specifically stated that the “show me
your papers” provision of the Arizona anti-immigrant law could raise constitutional concerns if state officers were required to hold individuals for
the sole purpose of obtaining information on an individual’s immigration
status.81 The Supreme Court was concerned with both unlawful and prolonged detention.82

79

The Police Executive Research Forum, an independent research organization on policing issues, noted that “[s]pending time and money on immigration enforcement can hinder the
ability of officers to respond to calls for service, conduct criminal investigations, and perform
the other duties required by their jobs.” POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, LOCAL POLICE
PERSPECTIVES ON STATE IMMIGRATION POLICIES 17 (2014), https://perma.cc/3GK3-FFB6.
80 Several civil rights organizations, community groups, and the U.S. federal government
challenged the Arizona law and the copycat laws in other states. The U.S. government’s legal
challenge to Arizona’s S.B. 1070 reached the Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States, 567
U.S. 387 (2012). While the Court permanently enjoined several provisions of the Arizona law,
it allowed the “show me your papers” provision to remain in effect absent indicia of an asapplied showing that detentions are delayed solely to verify an individual’s immigration status. Id. at 413-16. As a result of legal challenges against the laws in Alabama, Georgia, and
South Carolina, courts similarly blocked several provisions, but not others, such as the “show
me your papers” provision which remained in effect. See Joint Report Regarding Case Status
and Disposition at 3, Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012)
(No. 11-14535); Ga. Latino All. for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250 (11th
Cir. 2012); United States v. South Carolina, 906 F. Supp. 2d 463 (D.S.C. 2012) (dissolving
preliminary injunction of certain provisions in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387), aff’d, 720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Kim Chandler, Alabama Settles Lawsuit Over Immigration Law, AL.COM (Oct. 29, 2013, 4:13 PM),
https://perma.cc/ZVY8-R8AZ; Alan Gomez, South Carolina Puts Brakes on Immigration
Law, USA TODAY (Mar. 3, 2014, 8:32 PM), https://perma.cc/9YDP-XNX8.
81 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. at 413.
82 For a more robust discussion of the legal implications of this provision, see
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE FAULTY
LEGAL ARGUMENTS BEHIND IMMIGRATION DETAINERS (2013), https://perma.cc/DZ8XXMVH.
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Alabama and South Carolina tacitly accepted that it was clear that
officers were not allowed to extend traffic stops for the sole purpose of
investigating an individual’s immigration status.83 Nonetheless, not too
long after the release of the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. United
States, a federal district court in Arizona found that the Maricopa County
Sheriff’s Office’s (MCSO) use of traffic stops as a pretext to stop individuals of “Hispanic ancestry or race,” in order to form reasonable suspicion that the individual was in the United States without authorization,
was in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.84 Moreover, the Court noted that MCSO
was proceeding under the incorrect assumption that being present without
documents in the United States was a criminal violation of immigration
law.85 The Court ordered MCSO to permanently stop “using Hispanic ancestry or race as [a] factor in making law enforcement decisions pertaining to whether a person is authorized to be in the country.”86
5.

Discriminatory Encounters with Local Law Enforcement and
Impact on Community Safety

Sanctuary policies aim to foster trust between local law enforcement
and immigrant communities. However, when no sanctuary policy exists
and, instead, local law enforcement inquires into an individual’s immigration status during routine traffic stops, the prospect of discriminatory
encounters with local law enforcement emerges. Some state law enforcement officials from Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina, among others,
are also concerned with the specter of local police utilizing race as a factor
to determine “reasonable suspicion” that an individual is undocumented.87
A report from the Police Executive Research Forum, which gathered law
enforcement officials from around the country and from states most notably impacted by the anti-immigrant laws, noted that “[a]lthough the laws
prohibit using race, color, or ethnicity to make the determination, some
83 Joint Report Regarding Case Status and Disposition at 3-4, Hispanic Interest Coal. of
Ala. v. Bentley, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-14535) (agreeing that such policy
would violate the Supremacy Clause); United States v. South Carolina, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 471
(stating that Defendants argued that the law could be interpreted to avoid unconstitutional
detentions).
84 Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822 (D. Ariz. 2013), aff’d, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th
Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Maricopa County v. Melendres, 136 S. Ct. 799 (2016)
(mem.).
85 Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 825.
86 Id. at 826. As of January of 2018, the United States government is also challenging a
number of Maricopa County’s practices. United States v. Maricopa, 151 F. Supp. 3d 998 (D.
Ariz. 2015), appeal filed, No. 15-17558, 2018 WL 2091242 (9th Cir. Dec. 31, 2015)
(Westlaw).
87 See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 91, at 1.
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police officials worry that the lack of guidance on the reasonable suspicion standard leaves officers little choice but to assume that people they
encounter may be in the United States illegally.”88
While there is no exact data available on the effects of the anti-immigrant laws across Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina, studies and
anecdotal evidence shed light on the impact of these policies on communities and safety. A 2012 phone study of Latinos’ perspectives on cooperation with law enforcement in Cook County, Illinois, Harris County,
Texas, Los Angeles, California, and Maricopa County, Arizona found
that 70% of undocumented immigrants surveyed said that they were less
likely to contact law enforcement authorities if they were a victim of a
crime given local law enforcement’s increased role in federal immigration
enforcement.89 Additionally, 28% of U.S.-born Latinos surveyed were
concerned about the safety of those they knew who were undocumented
and, therefore, feared reporting crimes to the police.90 The survey respondents shared concerns that individuals who committed crimes were
moving into their neighborhoods with the knowledge that their crimes
would not be reported.91
Testimonials of individuals’ interactions with Georgia’s police provided examples of individuals trying to seek the police’s help but either
encountering roadblocks or feeling that the police unlawfully detained
them rather than investigating the reported crime.92 In Georgia, people of
color were disproportionately affected by increasing cooperation between
ICE and local law enforcement, and the disparity increased over time. In
DHS’s Fiscal Year 2013, 96.4% of individuals subject to ICE detainers
were defined by ICE as having dark or medium complexion as compared
to 66.7% in Fiscal Year 2007.93
Community policing is a policing practice that includes community
involvement and consultation, decentralization, and increased officer discretion, in order to increase community participation in problem solving
and enhance the legitimacy of the police within the community.94 Many
88

Id. at 17-18.
NIK THEODORE, DEP’T OF URBAN PLANNING & POLICY, UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI., INSECURE
COMMUNITIES: LATINO PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT, at i (2013), https://perma.cc/HQ56-RFWS.
90 Id.
91 Id. at ii.
92 See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUND. OF GA. ET AL., PREJUDICE, POLICING AND
PUBLIC SAFETY: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION HYPER-ENFORCEMENT IN THE STATE OF
GEORGIA 9, 11 (2014) [hereinafter ACLU, PREJUDICE, POLICING AND PUBLIC SAFETY],
https://perma.cc/2XW6-CPCU.
93 Id. at 14.
94 Community Policing and Procedural Justice, CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME POL’Y,
https://perma.cc/9XQC-UE5N (last visited May 15, 2018).
89
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local law enforcement officials are concerned with the entanglement between local police and federal immigration authorities because of the negative impact on community policing practices and community safety. In
2015, the Chief of the Salt Lake City Utah Police stated, “[r]equiring police to enforce federal immigration law undermines the trust and cooperation of immigrant communities, which are essential elements of community oriented policing.”95
In 2014, the Police Executive Research Forum released a report, Local Police Perspectives on State Immigration Policies, after convening
police and law enforcement officials from Alabama, Arizona, California,
Georgia, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia to discuss the impact of state
immigration laws on local law enforcement agencies.96 In this report, officials noted that the anti-immigrant laws have led localities to adopt policies that go against “public safety and community policing priorities.”97
The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing highlighted the importance of having laws, policies, and practices that do not interfere with
the ability of local law enforcement to build strong relationships with local communities.98
6.

Georgia’s Anti-Sanctuary Policy Oversight Mechanism:
Lacking Checks-and-Balances and Procedural Due Process
Protections, While Wasting Taxpayer Dollars

As part of its campaign to prevent and eliminate sanctuary policies,
the state of Georgia created a separate regulatory agency purposed with
coercing compliance with the state’s anti-sanctuary laws.99 The Immigration Enforcement Review Board (“IERB” or “Board”) is a quasi-judicial
body designed solely to receive and review complaints about violations

95 Lee Davidson, Two Utah Top Cops Oppose Making Local Police Immigration Agents,
SALT LAKE TRIB. (Aug. 6, 2015, 8:52 AM), https://perma.cc/RD6V-T6KD (statement of Salt
Lake City Interim Police Chief Mike Brown); see TASKFORCE ON SECURE COMMUNITIES,
HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 24 (2011), https://perma.cc/K2UX-3GXS (“When communities perceive
that police are enforcing federal immigration laws, especially if there is a perception that such
enforcement is targeting minor offenders, that trust is broken in some communities, and victims, witnesses and other residents may become fearful of reporting crime or approaching the
police to exchange information.”).
96 POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 91, at iv.
97 Id. at 26 (discussing Arizona’s S.B. 1070, but noting that perspectives varied regarding
its impact).
98 See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 18 (2015), https://perma.cc/L6DVH4QB (“It is the view of this task force that whenever possible, state and local law enforcement should not be involved in immigration enforcement.”).
99 See GA. CODE ANN. § 50-36-3(b) (2017).
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of Georgia’s anti-sanctuary law and violations of other anti-immigrant
laws.100 Where an agency or official is found to be in violation, the IERB
has the authority to impose sanctions.101
The IERB has authority to hear complaints concerning public agencies or employees “alleged to have violated or failed to properly enforce
[Georgia’s anti-sanctuary laws].”102 Any resident of Georgia,103 who is
also a registered voter, may submit a complaint.104 Complainants do not
need to show that they have been injured by an agency’s or an officer’s
failure to comply — essentially, complainants do not need to show standing to invoke the process of the Board.
Several of the IERB’s characteristics are noteworthy. The IERB is
composed of seven members, three members appointed by the state’s
Governor, two members appointed by the Lieutenant Governor, and two
members appointed by the Speaker of the House.105 This is noteworthy
because these positions are currently held by state officials who have long
supported anti-immigrant legislation and put forth anti-immigrant statements in Georgia.106 The IERB is empowered to operate as a tribunal by
engaging in trial-like proceedings to investigate and adjudicate complaints, even going so far as to hear appeals of initial decisions made by
its own members.107 It may also promulgate its own rules.108 The most
troubling aspects of the IERB are the processes by which it hears complaints, its power to sanction public agencies and officials, and the lack of
oversight and control that may be imposed on its members and actions.
The Board’s complaint process is deficient because it lacks oversight
and due process procedures that are present in other forms of administrative hearings. The statutory mandate for the IERB neither provides for

100

§ 50-36-3(e).
§ 50-36-3(g)–(h).
102 § 50-36-3(e).
103 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2-1(9) (2017) (“‘Resident’ means a person who has a permanent
home or domicile in Georgia and to which, having been absent, he or she has the intention of
returning.”).
104 § 50-36-3(e).
105 § 50-36-3(b).
106 See, e.g., Jeff Gill, Ralston Discusses Redistricting, HOPE, Immigration, GAINESVILLE
TIMES (May 31, 2011, 10:33 PM), https://perma.cc/SPQ6-V7ME; Jeremy Redmon, Deal
Signs Bill Expanding Immigration Crackdown, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 25, 2013, 10:13
AM), https://perma.cc/MM78-4D4S; Dan Whisenhunt, Lt. Governor Casey Cagle Escalates
Fight with Decatur Using State Immigration Board, DECATURISH (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://perma.cc/XY2F-A4FE.
107 § 50-36-3(i).
108 § 50-36-3(d)(3).
101
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oversight over its decisions, nor a process resembling procedural due process.109 For one thing, there is no independent state body overseeing the
actions of the IERB. As such, the IERB can act, and so far has acted, with
impunity.110
The sanctions that the IERB may impose are severe and may be detrimental to a public agency’s ability to function. Possible sanctions include “revocation of qualified local government status, loss of state appropriated funds, and a monetary fine of not less than $1,000.00 or more
than $5,000.00.”111 The failure to comply with remedial action also authorizes the Attorney General to bring a civil mandamus action against
the agency or employee in order to enforce compliance with the law and
the Board’s recommendations.112 These measures that could be particularly damaging for small localities leave public agencies and employees
with little choice but to comply.
Since its adoption, the IERB has engaged in gross overreach.113 The
IERB has also proven that it is willing to go beyond even its own rules’
limitations by investigating claims that are insufficiently pled. According
to the complaint process rules set by the IERB, a complaint must contain
“sufficient facts concerning the alleged violation . . . including a date or
range of dates in which this violation or failure to enforce allegedly occurred, to determine if a prima facie case exists for finding a violation or
failure to enforce.”114 The IERB failed to enforce this provision in 2012
when it considered a complaint filed by Michael Dale Smith. Smith’s
complaint alleged that the city of Vidalia was a sanctuary city.115 The
Board expressed concern over the lack of information alleged in Smith’s

109

See § 50-36-3; see also GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 291–2–.01 to 291–2–.05 (2018),
https://perma.cc/A37K-QKK7 (IERB complaint, hearing, and appeals regulations).
110 Also, in a recent meeting where Lieutenant Governor Casey Cagle filed a complaint
against the City of Decatur, an IERB member who had made statements to the media about
the City of Decatur policy ahead of the hearing refused to recuse himself. State Immigration
Board Will Hear Complaint Against City of Decatur in January, DECATURISH (Nov. 15, 2017),
https://perma.cc/VDH9-EQ82. He finally stepped down from the investigation after the city
filed a complaint. http://decaturish.com/2018/03/immigration-board-member-who-called-ltgov-cagle-a-winner-abstains-from-decatur-case/
111 § 50-36-3(h).
112 § 50-36-3(j).
113 See, e.g., Jeremy Redmon, Georgia’s Immigration Enforcement Panel Draws Scrutiny,
POLITICALLY GA. (Oct. 23, 2017, 5:32 PM), https://perma.cc/A3RV-FPXB (explaining that
nearly all of the 20 complaints since 2011 came from one individual with a known animus
towards immigrant communities and that the IERB’s lack of activity with filed complaints is
evidence that its actions are not within the state’s purview).
114 GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 291–2–.01(3)(c) (2018) (emphasis in original).
115 See Orlando Montoya, Officials Probe Immigration in Vidalia, GA. PUB.
BROADCASTING (July 2, 2012, 11:50 AM), https://perma.cc/K2QB-HLSK.
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complaint116 given the absence of specific names, dates, and locations in
the complaint, beyond the naming of the period from 2006-2012, to support the allegations.117 However, instead of dismissing the complaint for
a failure to establish sufficient facts, the Board voted unanimously to create a review panel and investigate Smith’s allegations, a demonstration of
the Board’s gross overreach.118 The unanimous approval of such a poorly
supported complaint demonstrates both the Board’s willingness to depart
from its own rules and its lack of regard for public entities’ limited time
and resources. Ultimately, after finding nothing actionable, the Board decided to dismiss the complaint.119 However, the mere fact that the Board
acted on the complaint, despite its substantive misgivings, shows the potential for abuse of power.
Associated with the overreach and checks-and-balance issues that
are plaguing the IERB’s proceedings is its cost to Georgia’s taxpayers.
Although IERB members are unpaid, “expenses incurred in connection
with the investigation and review of complaints . . . .” must still be reimbursed through the state government’s appropriations.120 In 2015, Georgia
appropriated $20,000 to the IERB.121 However, appropriations are only a
fraction of the actual expenses incurred by all parties involved in complaint proceedings. Even if a complaint is not factually sufficient on its
face, public agencies must still waste time and taxpayer money in responding to IERB investigations and defending against allegations by obtaining counsel.122 The cost for state agencies to comply with IERB investigations and pay sanctions is likely an acutely felt waste of taxpayer
dollars.
Its habit of overreach, its unchecked power, and the resulting wasted
resources liken the IERB’s proceedings to those of the Salem witch trials;
localities are being targeted because of animus toward immigrants.123
116 See Jeremy Redmon, Panel to Probe Immigration-Related Complaint Against Vidalia,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (June 29, 2012, 4:51 PM), https://perma.cc/SWL5-7ALQ.
117 Azadeh Shahshahani, Unchecked Power Granted by House Bill 87, JURIST (Aug. 10,
2012, 1:00 AM), https://perma.cc/42N3-2BAQ.
118 See Redmon, Panel to Probe Immigration-Related Complaint Against Vidalia, supra
note 130.
119 Associated Press, Immigration Panel Dismisses Complaint, GA. PUB. BROADCASTING
(Sept. 20, 2012, 2:45 PM), https://perma.cc/BH5J-SJ3H.
120 GA. CODE ANN. § 50-36-3(c) (2017).
121 H.B. 76, 2015-2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 4 (Ga. 2015).
122 See Edgar Treiguts, Immigration Panel Stirs Controversy, GA. PUB. BROADCASTING
(Sept. 11, 2011, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/KP8U-TMN9 (“If a complaint is filed against
you, even if it has no merit, you still have to waste time and money that a lot of counties don’t
have.”). (statement of Karen Weinstock, immigration attorney with the Atlanta firm Siskind
Susser).
123 An article from the Atlanta Journal Constitution is revealing. Redmon, Georgia’s Immigration Enforcement Panel Draws Scrutiny, supra note 127 (“Over the next six years the
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LOCAL RESISTANCE TO SECURE COMMUNITIES AND RELATED
PROGRAMS

Immigrant communities not only face unfriendly state policies, but
are subjected to harsh federal policies as well. Despite these policies,
many local communities, in addition to state governments and localities,
have met the challenge with strong opposition. This opposition mainly
comes in the form of sanctuary polices that are compliant with anti-sanctuary state legislation. The following is a discussion of some federal antiimmigrant policies adopted and discarded over the last ten years, and the
effective opposition toward those policies on the state and local level.
A. Local Policies Passed in Opposition to Secure Communities and
“287(g) Agreements”
Sanctuary policies have been a key part of the resistance to recent
federal anti-immigrant policies. The first of these recent policies was Secure Communities, which was launched by ICE in 2008.124 Secure Communities is an effort to prioritize the removal of noncitizens who were
arrested and/or violated criminal laws. To function, Secure Communities
relies on fingerprint-based biometric data gathered by the FBI from arrests and bookings made by state and local authorities.125 The FBI shares
the fingerprints with ICE, and ICE checks the fingerprints against its records to determine the immigration status of individuals.126 Under Secure
Communities, when fingerprints collected by state and local law enforcement match individuals who could be deportable, ICE then issues a detainer requesting the authorities at the state or local jail to continue holding the individual for up to forty-eight hours, excluding holidays and
weekends.127 The requested time allows ICE to interview the individual
and decide whether to seek the individual’s removal from the United
States.128
Many localities met ICE’s Secure Communities initiative with resistance and enacted sanctuary policies to mitigate its deleterious effects.
Immigration Enforcement Review Board received 20 complaints to investigate, according to
documents obtained through Georgia’s Open Records Act. And all but one came from the
same person: D.A. King, a longtime anti-immigration activist from Marietta.”).
124 See Overview, Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
https://perma.cc/Q9Y3-NL4Z (last visited May 18, 2018).
125 See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURE
COMMUNITIES: STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 3-5 [hereinafter SECURE COMMUNITIES:
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES], https://perma.cc/9J7X-4HA4.
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See id. at 8.
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Secure Communities purportedly didn’t impose “new or additional requirements” on state and local law enforcement agencies.129 However,
many jurisdictions were opposed to the additional cost of complying with
detainers and the constitutional concerns over holding individuals without
a warrant or probable cause. As of December 2016, 612 counties, and 3
states, had adopted policies that limited cooperation with ICE on detainers
in some way.130 As of December 2017, more than 760 counties and five
states had adopted policies that limit cooperation with ICE in some
way.131 Localities adopted policies in the form of police and sheriff’s department policies, executive orders, jail policies, ordinances, and resolutions.132 Two states, California and Connecticut, also passed TRUST
Acts, which set statewide restrictions on cooperation with ICE detainers.133 This outcry led ICE to replace Secure Communities.134
The 287(g) program was passed as a part of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996.135 This program promotes state
and local law officials’ collaboration with federal immigration laws by
allowing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enter into Memoranda of Agreements (MOAs) with local and state entities.136 These
MOAs essentially establish that state and local police officers can perform
certain functions of federal immigration agents, including issuing detainers, interviewing individuals about their immigration status, and transferring noncitizens into ICE custody.137 However, MOAs can be terminated
at any time by either DHS or the local law enforcement agency.138 Also,
once the MOA expires, DHS is not legally obligated to renew it.139 Major
129 Process,
Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
https://perma.cc/Q9Y3-NL4Z (last visited May 18, 2018).
130 See LENA GRABER & NIKKI MARQUEZ, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., SEARCHING FOR
SANCTUARY: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICA’S COUNTIES & THEIR VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE WITH
DEPORTATIONS 12 (2016), https://perma.cc/FC6W-38D7 (showing that brackets three through
seven include the 612 counties that limit cooperation with ICE).
131 ILRC, THE RISE OF SANCTUARY, supra note 31, at 11, 20.
132 For a comprehensive compilation of these local policies, see Detainer Policies,
IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. (Aug. 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/QB2D-Z2J9.
133 Sam Dorman, DHS Designates California and Connecticut as Sanctuary States, WASH.
FREE BEACON (Mar. 31, 2017, 9:40 AM), https://perma.cc/6969-JL2U.
134 See discussion supra INTRODUCTION; Jeremy Redmon, Immigration Enforcement Program to Be Replaced in Jails Nationwide, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec. 14, 2014, 5:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/4RFB-8DEJ.
135 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-563, to -564 (1996); INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(g).
136 AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE 287(G) PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2017),
https://perma.cc/ZB89-4TV3.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
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complaints regarding the 287(g) program include that these programs are
expensive for state and local agencies and have resulted in racial profiling.140
1.

Case Study: Georgia Localities’ Efforts to Enhance
Community Trust and Safety

Despite widespread resistance in other states, the response in Georgia was grossly disproportionate to the effect of Secure Communities in
the state. Of the 381,406 individuals deported through Secure Communities since its implementation in 2008, 12,525 were living in Georgia.141 It
was not until years after the adoption of Secure Communities that Georgia
localities began to show opposition to the program.
Seven Georgia localities showed resistance to ICE detainers. Three
of the counties, Fulton, Clayton, and DeKalb, are concentrated in Atlanta
and the surrounding area.142 In September 2014, Fulton County became
the first Georgia locality to issue a policy of noncompliance in regards to
Secure Communities.143 Fulton County commissioners issued a resolution
to urge the sheriff’s office to limit compliance with ICE’s voluntary detainers requests and ICE requests generally.144 The resolution urged the
sheriff’s office to decline ICE requests for access to individuals and for
use of Fulton County facilities, and to prohibit county employees from
communicating with ICE about the incarceration or release status of individuals while on duty, unless the federal government agrees to reimburse
Fulton County for the cost of compliance, ICE agents have a “criminal
warrant” (that meets the standard of probable cause), or the county has “a
legitimate law enforcement purpose that is not related to the enforcement
of immigration law.”145
DeKalb County and Clayton County soon followed suit.146 Clayton
County and DeKalb County’s policies of limited compliance came directly from their sheriffs’ offices.147 In November 2014, the Clayton
County Sheriff’s office sent an email stating that the office would no
140

Id. at 4-8.
Redmon, Immigration Enforcement Program to Be Replaced in Jails Nationwide, supra note 152.
142 See Jeremy Redmon & Greg Bluestein, Georgia Cities Limiting Cooperation with ICE
Amid Trump’s Crackdown, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Oct. 12, 2017, 6:39 PM),
https://perma.cc/D3JE-W96E.
143 Id.
144 See Res. 14-0683, Fulton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs (2014), https://perma.cc/3M2B-LLVT.
145 Id. at 2.
146 Redmon, Immigration Enforcement Program to Be Replaced in Jails Nationwide, supra note 152.
147 See Redmon & Bluestein, Georgia Cities Limiting Cooperation with ICE Amid
Trump’s Crackdown, supra note 162.
141
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longer detain or extend the detention of anyone at the request of ICE unless ICE presented the sheriff’s office with a judicially issued warrant authorizing the detention.148 In December 2014, DeKalb County’s Sheriff’s
office also released a memorandum outlining its refusal to honor ICE requests to extend the detention of released DeKalb County jail inmates
without a warrant or other sufficient probable cause.149 Other localities in
Georgia, namely Fayette County, Clarke County, the City of Clarkston,
and the City of Decatur, also followed suit.150 Studies have shown that
counties with sanctuary policies have lower crimes rates and stronger
economies than nonsanctuary counties.151
In contrast to the policies adopted by these seven localities to limit
their collaboration with ICE, four other Georgia counties, Cobb,152 Gwinnett,153 Hall,154 and Whitfield,155 maintained 287(g) agreements.156 The
287(g) program allows ICE to partner with local law enforcement agencies and delegate some of their immigration enforcement functions.157
Governor Nathan Deal encouraged the formation of 287(g) partnerships
in an attempt to allay fears of the cost of enforcing HB 87.158 In reality,
the federal government agreed to pay the cost of training local law en-

148

Jeremy Redmon, Clayton County Sheriff’s Office Stops Complying with ICE Detainers,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Nov. 19, 2014, 12:23 PM), https://perma.cc/Z53D-MNHJ.
149 Press Release, Jeffrey L. Mann, Sheriff, DeKalb Cty. Sheriff’s Office, DeKalb Sheriff
Will Not Hold Released Inmates for Immigrations and Customs Without Warrants (Dec. 4,
2014), https://perma.cc/V6NN-NMFQ.
150 See PROJECT SOUTH ET AL., GEORGIA NON-DETAINER POLICIES, supra note 74.
151 “The data are clear: Crime is statistically significantly lower in sanctuary counties compared to nonsanctuary counties. Moreover, economies are stronger in sanctuary counties—
from higher median household income, less poverty, and less reliance on public assistance to
higher labor force participation, higher employment-to-population ratios, and lower unemployment.” TOM K. WONG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., THE
EFFECTS OF SANCTUARY POLICIES ON CRIME AND THE ECONOMY 1 (2017),
https://perma.cc/X398-QE3R.
152 Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Cobb Cty.
Bd. of Comm’rs, & Cobb Cty. Sheriff [hereinafter Cobb 287(g)], https://perma.cc/YB9DQSME.
153 Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t & Gwinnett
Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t [hereinafter Gwinnett 287(g)], https://perma.cc/SD8L-LQ37.
154 Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t & Hall Cty.
Sheriff’s Office [hereinafter Hall 287(g)], https://perma.cc/4SGA-F4VJ.
155 Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t & Whitfield
Cty. Sheriff’s Office [hereinafter Whitfield 287(g)], https://perma.cc/8GVL-JVHZ.
156 INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2018).
157 Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration & Nationality Act,
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://perma.cc/U72B-BL2D (last visited May 15,
2018).
158 See Jeanne Bonner, Who Will Pay for New Immigration Law?, GA. PUB.
BROADCASTING (May 26, 2011, 2:27 AM), https://perma.cc/Z7BM-CQUL.
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forcement in immigration enforcement through 287(g) partnerships; however, with the exception of providing technology in some instances, it
does not cover the cost of enforcement itself.159 In Gwinnett County,
Sheriff Butch Conway credited 287(g) with decreasing the crime rate and
the prison population.160 Immigrant rights activists dispute that claim by
arguing that 287(g) merely discouraged undocumented immigrants from
reporting crime.161 The true cost of 287(g) has been the loss of trust between law enforcement and the immigrant community.162 Referred to as
a “successful force multiplier,” 287(g) agreements have made a comeback
under the Trump administration.163
Both Secure Communities and 287(g) have had a devastating effect
on communities in Georgia. The local law enforcement in Georgia voluntarily turned over more than 54,000 individuals to ICE between 2007 and
June 2013.164 The number of detainers that ICE issued between 2007 and
2013 grew by 17,169%, indicating the increased cooperation between
ICE and local law enforcement.165 Perhaps the most insidious effect of the
cooperation has been the increased reliance on racial profiling by local
law enforcement.166 The overwhelming majority of detainers issued in
Georgia were for persons of Latin American origin.167 Specifically,
97.7% of ICE arrests and 96% of ICE detainers from 2007 to 2013 targeted individuals with medium or dark complexions.168 U.S. citizens have
also been caught up in the frenzy of racial profiling created by the collaboration, as 48 of the 54 ICE detainers issued for U.S. citizens targeted
persons of medium to dark complexion.169

159

See Cobb 287(g), supra note 172, at 5-6; Gwinnett 287(g), supra note 173, at 5-6; Hall
287(g), supra note 174, at 5-6; Whitfield 287(g), supra note 175, at 5-6.
160 Tyler Estep, Sherriff: Jail’s Dropping Population Due to Controversial Immigration
Program, GWINNETT DAILY POST (Jan. 10, 2014), https://perma.cc/7BLK-KDQV.
161 See id.
162 See generally ACLU, PREJUDICE, POLICING AND PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 106.
163 See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://perma.cc/4UZP-UXFT.
164 ACLU, PREJUDICE, POLICING AND PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 106, at 10.
165 Id. at 10-11.
166 Id. at 12-14.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 13.
169 Id. at 14.
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Changes to Secure Communities

ICE responded to nationwide criticism of Secure Communities by
retiring the program and replacing it with the Priorities Enforcement Program (“PEP”).170 The showing of probable cause under PEP did not satisfy the requirements of policies that were put into place by resistant localities. As a doctrine, probable cause originates in the Fourth
Amendment.171 Probable cause consists of “facts and circumstances
within the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, under the circumstances
shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.”172
However, the showing of probable cause on the detainer form under
the now defunct PEP could consist of a final order of removal, pendency
of removal proceedings, biometric match that reflects no lawful status or
removability, statements made by the individual to an immigration officer, and/or other reliable evidence.173 None of the items listed here indicate an offense under state law. Instead, all the items relate to the enforcement of immigration law. None of the listed items amount to a judicial
warrant and, thus, would fall short of a policy such as that present in Clayton County, Georgia.174 All the listed items would also fall short of a policy such as that urged by commissioners in Fulton County, Georgia, requiring a warrant or a “legitimate law enforcement purpose that is not
related to the enforcement of immigration law.”175 Furthermore, none of
the listed items would satisfy California’s TRUST Act,176 and only a final
order of removal would satisfy Connecticut’s TRUST Act.177
This change was short lived as Secure Communities was revived by
the Trump Administration following the November 2016 presidential
election. On January 25, 2017, President Trump signed an executive order
that dealt with immigration enforcement.178 On February 20, 2017, thenDHS Secretary, John Kelly, signed two implementation memoranda

170

See Priority Enforcement Program, supra note 18.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause . . . .”).
172 United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)) (internal quotations omitted).
173 OFFICE OF ENF’T & REMOVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T,
PRIORITY ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 2, https://perma.cc/5D79-V6TL.
174 See Redmon, Clayton County Sheriff’s Office Stops Complying with ICE Detainers,
supra note 168.
175 Res. 14-0683, Fulton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs 2 (2014), https://perma.cc/3M2B-LLVT.
176 See California Values Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6(a)(1) (West 2018).
177 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-192h(b) (2018).
178 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
171
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which sought to carry out these policies.179 In one of the implementation
memorandum, entitled “Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to Serve
the National Interest”, Secretary Kelly ended the PEP program and revived the largely discredited Secure Communities program.180 Federal
Courts have been skeptical about the constitutionality of ICE detainers.181
With the reintroduction of Secure Communities, the same issues
which plagued the prior administration will be present once again as the
ineffective changes made to Secure Communities from the implementation of PEP would no longer be existent. These issues include the erosion
in community trust and, accordingly, a reduction in community safety.
III. THREATS TO SANCTUARY POLICIES AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
Pending and recently proposed legislation at the national level
demonstrates traction in terms of federal efforts to eliminate sanctuary
policies. Similar to the anti-sanctuary provisions adopted within anti-immigrant laws, these policies seek to eradicate sanctuary provisions by
eliminating localities’ rights to determine: when and with whom to share
information, and when to honor ICE’s detainer requests. Nevertheless,
since many legal challenges to federal and state anti-sanctuary policies
exist and have recently been successful, community groups should remain
encouraged to be active in pushing for more sanctuary policies.
A.

Executive Branch Efforts to Defund Sanctuary Cities Before and
After the November 2016 Presidential Election

Both prior to and after the November 2016 presidential election, the
Executive Branch has taken steps to assess its power to limit sanctuary
policies. In 2016, a memorandum from the U.S. Inspector General concluded that sanctuary policies could violate 8 U.S.C. § 1373,182 a federal
statute prohibiting local and state governments from enacting laws or policies that limit communications regarding the immigration or citizenship
179 See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://perma.cc/4UZP-UXFT; Q&A: DHS Implementation of the Executive Order on Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY
(Feb. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/ECT6-376X.
180 Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://perma.cc/4UZP-UXFT.
181 See, e.g., Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015); Galarza v. Szalczyk,
745 F.3d 634 (3rd Cir. 2014).
182 Memorandum from Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Karol V. Mason, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 31, 2016),
https://perma.cc/9LDZ-TZ2G.
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status of individuals with DHS.183 The U.S. Department of Justice, Office
of Justice Programs (“OJP”) concluded that the authorizing legislation for
the Byrne and Jobs for America’s Graduates (“JAG”) grant programs requires the grant recipients to certify their compliance with the “authorizing legislation and all other applicable federal laws,” including 8 U.S.C
§ 1373.184 The OJP further stated that noncompliant programs must take
steps to become compliant; the failure to comply could result in “the withholding of grant funds or ineligibility for future OJP grants or subgrants,
suspension or termination of the grant, or other administrative, civil, or
criminal penalties, as appropriate.”185
One of the largest challenges to sanctuary policies thus far has been
President Trump’s executive order released on January 25, 2017 dealing
with immigration enforcement.186 During his candidacy, President Donald Trump pledged to do away with all federal funding for sanctuary cities.187 Not even a week into his presidency, President Trump signed the
executive order “Enhancing Public Safety in The Interior of the United
States” which, among other things, sought to cut off federal funding from
cities and states with santuary policies.188 The executive order gave the
DHS Secretary the authority to designate a jurisdiction as a sanctuary jurisdiction.189 The significance of this tool bestowed upon the Secretary is
that the executive order failed to give basic instructions on how such a
designation would occur, when it could occur, and on what basis. The
executive order also failed to instruct localities on how they could refute
such a designation and prevent funds from being withdrawn. This provision is particularly troubling given the experience of states, such as Georgia, which have sought to go after localities thought to have sanctuary
policies, and have used questionable tactics. The executive order also directed the U.S. Attorney General to “take appropriate enforcement action
against any entity that violates 8 U.S.C. 1373, or which has in effect a
statute, policy, or practice that prevents or hinders the enforcement of
Federal law.”190 Furthermore, the order directed the Director of the Office

183

IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR. & WASH. DEF. ASS’N, FAQ ON 8 U.S.C. § 1373 AND
FEDERAL FUNDING THREATS TO “SANCTUARY CITIES” 1 (2017), https://perma.cc/E25T-T46D.
184 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH 8 U.S.C. § 1373, https://perma.cc/6GV6-994E.
185 Id.
186 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
187 Tami Luhby, Trump Condemns Sanctuary Cities, but What Are They?, CNN (Sep. 1,
2016, 10:08 AM), https://perma.cc/U8FU-H6WF.
188 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
189 Id. at 8,801.
190 Id.
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of Management and Budget “to obtain and provide relevant and responsive information on all Federal grant money that currently is received by
any sanctuary jurisdiction.”191 Already, the Miami-Dade County Commission in Florida, for fear of losing federal funding, voted to end the
county’s sanctuary status.192 Since then, the U.S. Department of Justice
has issued a determination that Miami-Dade is no longer designated as a
sanctuary city.193
Aside from cutting off access to grants, lawsuits are another tool that
President Trump could employ to target and punish sanctuary cities.194
Even going beyond diminishing santuary policies, the executive order directed the U.S. Attorney General to take immediate action to develop new
287(g) agreements.195 These steps will likely result in the erosion of community trust as such agreements have done in the past, as discussed in
Section III.
Nonetheless, sanctuary policies remain a valid option in the wake of
federal anti-sanctuary policies. Many cities and counties have spoken up
against the Trump administration’s plan to increasingly use state and local
law officials to enforce immigration laws, such as New York and Chicago.196 By 2017, five state had enacted statewide policies to limit coop-

191

Id.
Alan Gomez, Miami-Dade Commission Votes to End County’s ‘Sanctuary’ Status,
USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2017, 3:06 PM), https://perma.cc/FB8Q-FPEY.
193 See Douglas Hanks, Miami-Dade Complied with Trump to Change its ‘Sanctuary’ Status. It Worked, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 7, 2017, 12:40 PM), https://perma.cc/PRM4-YQZ3.
194 See Alan Gomez, Trump Can Punish ‘Sanctuary Cities’ that Protect Undocumented
Immigrants, USA TODAY (Jan. 10, 2017, 11:57 AM), https://perma.cc/X2R5-RNG3.
195 See generally Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017). In addition,
ICE was ordered to put out a weekly report highlighting the localities that refused to honor
ICE detainers. On January 25th, 2017, President Donald J. Trump signed into effect Executive
Order 13,767 on “Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements.” In relevant
part, this order instructed the Secretary of Homeland Security to “immediately take appropriate action to engage with the Governors of the States, as well as local officials, for the purpose
of preparing to enter into agreements under section 287(g) of the INA . . . .” Id. at 8,795. The
order further directed the Secretary to “take appropriate action, through agreements under section 287(g) of the INA, or otherwise, to authorize State and local law enforcement officials,
as the Secretary determines are qualified and appropriate, to perform the functions of immigration officers in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the
United States under the direction and the supervision of the Secretary.” Id. Since then, the
number of law enforcement agencies that have entered into 287(g) agreements with ICE has
nearly doubled, totaling 60 as of August 2017. ICE Announces 18 New 287(g) Agreements in
Texas, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (July 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/3XQ5XNL8. A majority of the increase has come from Texas, where 18 new counties have signed
287(g) agreements since Trump’s election. Id.
196 Liz Robbins, ‘Sanctuary City‘ Mayors Vow to Defy Trump’s Immigration Order, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/E9RT-UN9G.
192
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eration with ICE and/or disallow the use of state resources for immigraiton enforcement (California, Illinois, New York, Oregon, Washington).197
Indeed, many cities have challenged Trump’s executive order both politically and judicially; the cities of San Francisco, Santa Clara, Seattle,
Richmond, Lawrence, Chelsea, and Los Angeles have either sued the
Trump Administration in federal court or have announced plans to do
so.198
On November 20, 2017, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California granted San Francisco and Santa Clara a
nation-wide permanent injunction staying the anti-sanctuary provisions
of the executive order.199 As the injunction applied nationally, the cases
brought by other cities have also been stayed.
In Miami-Dade, an individual secured release through a writ of habeas corpus when a judge determined that he was detained as a direct
result of the President’s executive order.200 In this order, which was issued
before the Northern California injunction, the judge followed an analogous path of reasoning that concluded that federal coercion of local law
enforcement through threats of pulling grants was a violation of the Tenth
Amendment.201 The Trump administration has appealed the decision to
the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, where it is currently pending.202
The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the federal
government from commandeering states and localities to perform certain
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ILRC, THE RISE OF SANCTUARY, supra note 31, at 20.
Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (granting permanent injunction for both Santa Clara and San Francisco; Los Angeles also moved to intervene),
appeal filed, No. 3:17-cv-00574 (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 2017); City of Seattle v. Trump, No. 2:17cv-00497-BAT, 2017 BL 471111 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2017) (staying proceedings after permanent injunction granted in County of Santa Clara v. Trump); City of Richmond v. Trump,
No. 3:17-cv-01535, 2017 BL 292782 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2017); City of Chelsea v. Trump,
No. 1:17-cv-10214-GAO (D. Mass. Feb. 8, 2017) (staying proceedings after permanent injunction granted in County of Santa Clara v. Trump).
199 Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1219 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
200 Lacroix v. Junior, Nos. F17-376, F17-1770, 2017 WL 837477 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1,
2017).
201 See id. at *6.
202 Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal filed, No.
3:17-cv-00574 (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 2017).
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acts.203 Furthermore, sanctuary policies can be crafted in such a way as to
avoid violating 8 U.S.C. § 1373.204
B.

National Legislation: House Bill 83

Sanctuary policies faced opposition at the federal level in 2015.205
The murder of Kate Steinle, a young woman from California, in the summer of 2015 by Juan Francisco Lopez-Sanchez, an undocumented immigrant,206 catalyzed U.S. House Republicans to promulgate a bill that
would have stripped certain federal funding from local governments that
ignored ICE detainers.207 Prior to the murder, a San Francisco sheriff had
released Lopez-Sanchez after an old marijuana charge against him was
dropped, despite a detainer request from ICE.208 The bill was targeted at
preventing sanctuary policies like the one implemented in San Francisco.209 The bill passed the House by a vote of 241-179.210 Law enforcement organizations opposed the bill for fear that undocumented immigrants would become less willing to trust the police and, thus, the bill
would decrease the effectiveness of law enforcement.211 Religious leaders
also wrote op-eds in opposition to the bill, decrying anti-sanctuary policies as immoral and unjust and calling for immigration reform that mends
the negative effects of current policy instead of condemning immigrants.212 The opposition, as well as a veto threat from the White House,
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proved effective, and Democrats in the Senate blocked passage of the
bill.213
House Republicans have most recently introduced the Mobilizing
Against Sanctuary Cities Act.214 The Act215 would allow the Attorney
General to identify the states and localities in violation of Section 1373 of
the Unites States Code.216 The cities identified by the Attorney General
would be ineligible for federal funding for at least one year and until the
Attorney General certifies that they are in compliance with Section
1373.217 Nevertheless, this bill, if enacted as law, would have run up
against the same legal challenges that are being mounted against the executive branch’s efforts to eliminate sanctuary policies, as discussed
above.
CONCLUSION
This article has sought to make clear the consequences of forced state
and local involvement in the enforcement of federal immigration policy
and how sanctuary policies can be an effective tool in combating these
consequences. The attempts of the federal government and states, such as
Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina, to coerce localities into cooperating with ICE will exacerbate budget constraints, expose localities to civil
liability, and result in unconstitutional policing. Additionally, if Georgia’s
experience with the IERB is any indication of what is to come with the
federal crackdown on localities with sanctuary policies, many localities
across the nation could be facing costly battles to maintain these policies
that foster community trust and reduce civil liability of localities. Furthermore, Secure Communities and PEP have led to the separation of families, resulting in reduction in community trust. Any such effort risks diminishing trust between law enforcement and immigrant communities
and alienating immigrants from cooperating with the local police.
For the state government to take on the regulation of immigration
policies, an issue in the federal arena, in such an involved way results in
taking away limited local resources from essential state functions. The
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return of Secure Communities and 287(g) will break down efforts at community policing and could result in increased reliance on policing practices that open the door to racial profiling. Immigrants will be discouraged
from reporting crime, therefore making communities less safe.
Finally, sanctuary cities are in danger of being swept away by antisanctuary legislation on the federal and state level, in addition to federal
executive branch policy. The 2017 executive orders and implementation
memos threaten to pressure sanctuary communities into nonexistence.
The memos single out jurisdictions that do not honor detainers, and the
executive orders promise to strip federal funding from jurisdictions that
adopt policies that limit communication with ICE. Anti-immigrant and
anti-sanctuary legislation at the state and local levels have proven to be
detrimental to local economies, caused increased risk of exposure to civil
liability for localities, and diminished community safety. Communities
choose to adopt sanctuary policies in order to minimize the negative consequences of federal policies such as detainers. The continued adoption
of sanctuary policies is necessary to avoid the negative consequences of
anti-sanctuary state provisions of state laws. Nevertheless, as of this article’s publication date, the legal challenges brought against the executive
branch’s attempts to limit sanctuary policies were promising.
Community groups can still play a large role in shaping policy, despite the state and federal efforts to attack and eliminate sanctuary policies. Community groups can continue to urge localities to adopt sanctuary
policies that are compliant with anti-sanctuary laws, as seen in Georgia or
Alabama. Additionally, community groups can continue to bring lawsuits
challenging the legality of detainers in their respective jurisdictions. Finally, community groups can bring legal challenges to prolonged detention at police stops and prolonged arrest.
For the reasons stated above, state legislatures and congress must
avoid passing anti-sanctuary legislation. Instead, this article recommends
that localities adopt policies that foster community trust in order to better
protect their immigrant communities from abuse and to eliminate civil
liability related to unconstitutional practices, such as the honoring of ICE
detainers.

